By Denny Harmon, February 13, 2006
In the early days of aviation it was soon learned that as the size of the aircraft grew, so did the aircraft systems – fuel, oil, hydraulic, electrical, propulsion, etc. One of the results of all this growth was the addition of many dials, gauges, levers, knobs and charts which demanded more and more of the pilot’s attention.
It thus became clear that on certain types of aircraft piloting was more than a one-man job. A pilot had only two hands and two eyes, and he had to fly the aircraft. It was impossible for him to do this and read and react to a multitude of dials, gauges and charts at the same time. He needed assistance.
The co-pilot gave him some help. Together they flew the aircraft, one keeping an eye on the gauges and extraneous duties while the other concentrated on the primary job of piloting.
But while aircraft were increasing in size and complexity so was the need for maximum range, endurance, and reliability. One of the problems growing out of all these factors, especially in the case of the multi-engine transport and bomber aircraft, was the need for managing four or more high performance engines. The pilot and co-pilot would be so busy just piloting these huge aircraft that they would not have time to manage the engines and systems in a safe and efficient manner. It was determined after exhaustive analysis that the factors involved were so complex that they required the services of a special “third man” in the cockpit trained in a new technical field called “Flight Engineering.”
The first flight engineers were used on the U.S. Navy NC Flying Boats. The first aircraft to fly across the Atlantic was the NC-4 in 1919. The normal crew consisted of commander/navigator, pilot, co-pilot and two engineers.
The need for flight engineers was firmly established by Pan American Airways on their famous "Clipper” flying boats. Pan American Airways pioneered the concept of scheduled trans-oceanic flights in the thirties. This concept would not have been feasible if it had not been for the flight engineers carried on these long over water flights. Transoceanic aerial navigation was in its infancy and was quite primitive. Maximum range and endurance were crucial, indeed, not only the success of the flights but the lives of the crew and passengers depended on flying the route then having sufficient fuel remaining to look for that tiny “dot of an island” if necessary. It was the flight engineer's duty to calculate the optimum altitude, airspeed, and power settings required to insure that they had that precious last bit of fuel.
The Army Air Corps had started carrying crew chiefs on some large aircraft in the late twenties; generally these men performed no duties in flight and were carried along mainly to affect repairs on the ground, if needed, when away from their home field.
These men did prove their value, however, and this concept eventually developed into the crew position known as the Aerial Engineer, specialty code 2750, on the B-17 and B-24. While these were authorized crewmembers who were assigned important preflight and inflight duties, their inflight duties were limited and they performed no performance calculations. In combat they manned a gun. They were basically mechanics with limited crew training.
In 1938, a mission involving several B-17's was made to South America, on which there were several long legs between stops. These flights carried two extra pilots, one of whom acted as the navigator while the other three alternated as pilot, co-pilot, and cruise control monitor. One of these pilots was Curtis E. LeMay, who would later become Commander of the Strategic Air Command and ultimately Air Force Chief of Staff. On the ground they all pitched in on the maintenance, since they carried no mechanics. While no one was called a flight engineer, this does seem to be the first recorded use of crewmembers to specifically perform the duties of a full-fledged flight engineer in the Army Air Corps.
The Air Force Flight Engineer, as such, dates only from the introduction of long range aircraft such as the B-29 Super-Fortress and the C-69 Constellation. These aircraft were so complex that the third crew position required formalized training. So urgent was the need for these trained flight engineers that the Air Corps had to turn to its civilian counterparts to obtain qualified instructors, training aids, and materials to implement a flight engineer training program.
At first it was planned that the flight engineer would be a cross-trained pilot. Cross-training was to require pilots of such aircraft to progress from flight engineer to co-pilot to pilot. At first this plan appeared feasible, but from the standpoint of availability of personnel, primary interest, attitude, motivation, and particularly the absence of a technical background, the plan was not too successful. In actual practice, some pilots were assigned to flight engineer duties on a semi-permanent basis since this improved their proficiency as flight engineers. This policy was unpopular, however, with the pilots who were relegated to flight engineer duty.
In May 1944, a separate officer's specialty code, 1028, Aircraft Observer (flight engineer), was established, thus opening the door to non-pilot officers as well as to pilots.
Another source of flight engineers was still needed. Since a large part of the flight engineer’s duties involved the technical operation of the engines and systems it seemed only logical that aircraft mechanics would make a good source for potential flight engineers. With proper screening, this program was successful, for these men proved to be intelligent and highly motivated. Finally, they received wings and, in most cases, an officer's commission upon graduation from flight engineer training.
Army Air Corps policy vacillated on the subject of commissions. Apparently the War Department was only authorized a certain percentage of its force levels to be commissioned officers, therefore new pilots, navigators, bombardiers, and flight engineers frequently graduated as commissioned officers from one class, flight officers (a rank similar to warrant officer) from another, and noncommissioned officers with the rank of Master Sergeant from still another.
A closely defined task analysis was begun in May 1944. The final job description combined elements from several other jobs, notably those of the aerial engineer, navigator, and pilot. By V-J Day the flight engineer position had developed into two principal functions. The first function is to operate and maintain, in flight, the engines and systems of the aircraft, and to perform certain preflight and postflight duties. This technical aspect of the flight engineer's job demands an intimate knowledge of the design features of a specific aircraft as well as a broad general knowledge of aircraft engineering technology, and aircraft maintenance management procedures.
The second function of the flight engineer is to plan and calculate the aircraft performance for each phase of the flight; takeoff, climb, cruise, descent, and landing. This requires training in physics including aerodynamics, thermodynamics, statics, kinematics, and energy management. The flight engineer determines the power settings required for flight so as to obtain the optimum performance from the fuel on board. This task, called “cruise control,” involves procedures somewhat comparable to those in navigation and was a part of the initial planning of all tactical operations, since long-range missions were planned on the basis of optimum aircraft performance. Cruise control involves at least three phases – preparation of the flight plan, keeping a log during flight and inflight revision of this plan to compensate for unforeseen changes. Today, much of the flight engineers duties have been taken over by computers.
Flight engineer training reached a peak in August 1945. With the cessation of hostilities training virtually came to a standstill. The rush to demobilization and inducements outside the service resulted in the loss of some of the more qualified flight engineers. Flight engineer schools were closed, no energetic career program was developed, and uncertainty existed concerning the professional status it should occupy. This was followed by the grounding of the remaining commissioned officer flight engineers in 1948.
Fortunately, a small group of officer flight engineers had continued to maintain a high interest in their specialty. This group provided competent supervisory personnel for OJT training and the reopening of a school for noncommissioned officer flight engineers to provide for replacements and force expansion. Others were rightly justified for staff positions in combat organizations at squadron, wing, and command levels to supervise flight engineer activities and to formulate tactical plans. One successful commander utilized civilian aeronautical engineers and available flight engineers to analyze and provide answers to most of his operations and maintenance problems. In so doing he raised the educational level and value of the command's maintenance and operations personnel, and at the same time developed better methods for the tactical employment of his aircraft.
Then starting in 1952 it was decided that flight engineers assigned to the Strategic Air Command should be commissioned officers. A new officer's career field was developed, Aircraft Performance Engineer, AFSC 4344. Aviation Cadets were sent to Mather AFB for 28 to 36 weeks for Aircraft Performance Engineer School. Essentially the school consisted of intensive training in aircraft maintenance and the same training in aircraft performance that the noncommissioned officer flight engineers received.
Certain qualified noncommissioned officer flight engineers received direct commissions as Second Lieutenants, First Lieutenants, or Captains, depending on age, rank, experience, etc. The noncommissioned officers who did not qualify for a commission continued to fly as before, except that each crew had to contain at least one commissioned officer flight engineer.
Also in 1952, an experimental program was initiated wherein certain new enlistees in the Air Force who were not NCO’s, but were the top graduates with high scores on the Armed Forces Aptitude test, were sent directly from aircraft maintenance school to flight engineer school without ever having had any practical experience as a mechanic. Most of these men did become successful flight engineers but mostly because they had superior intelligence levels and had been the top graduates from aircraft maintenance school. Their success notwithstanding, the conclusions drawn from the experiment were that new flight engineers should be experienced aircraft maintenance NCO's.
In 1954 the Air Force was drawing similar conclusions regarding the officer flight engineers who had never had any previous maintenance experience. At this time, furthermore, the officer force was stricken with a Reduction In Force, which compounded the belief that flight engineers should not be commissioned officers. In latter 1954 came the end of the commissioned officer flight engineers. Those officers who so chose were retrained as pilots (those who had been commissioned through the Aviation Cadet program only), navigators, bombardiers, or in non-rated specialties, while the rest were RIF'd back to a noncommissioned officer rank and continued their flight engineer duties.
From latter 1954 until the retirement of the B-36, the flight engineer continued to ride the crest of a popularity wave, since throughout the Air Force it was known that these men were indispensable to the defense of our country and until recently had been commissioned officers.
The outspoken and controversial commander of the Strategic Air Command of that time didn’t like having flight engineers. So using the reasoning that it would remove one man from harm’s way, he insisted that the B-52, which replaced the B-36 as this country's primary long-range nuclear bomber, have no flight engineer. The reasoning was disingenuous since the aircraft carried bombs intended to kill millions of people, but the justification served its purpose. Although flight engineers were required on the KC-97 tankers, which the B-52's relied upon for inflight refueling, the flight engineer was beginning to be deemed as unnecessary.
The piston-engined tankers of SAC were replaced by KC-135's, which like the B-52’s have no flight engineers, again because the commander of SAC didn’t want flight engineers. Interestingly, a 1975 study, conducted through the Air Force Flight Safety Program, concluded that the B-52, which has eight engines, inflight refueling, a complex fuel system with center-of-gravity shift issues, carries nuclear weapons, but no flight engineer, had an accident rate that was twenty times worse than the C-141! The same study found that the KC-135, which also does not have a flight engineer, had an accident rate that was sixteen times worse than the C-141, although they were basically similar four-engine aircraft having much the same type long-range mission.
In the case of the KC-135 it seems incredible that there is no flight engineer since the aircraft is nearly identical to the Boeing 707, which does have a flight engineer. In fact it seems unlawful, since in 1948 the U.S. Congress ruled that all aircraft having more than 80,000 pounds gross weight must have a flight engineer on board as a regular member of the crew. This ruling was deemed necessary because of the increasing complexity of large aircraft. An aircraft crash can be hazardous not only to the crew and passengers but also to the people on the ground over whom the aircraft fly.
Another SAC aircraft that begged for a flight engineer was the supersonic B-58. This aircraft had four afterburning engines, inflight refueling, a serious center of gravity shift with fuel consumption/refueling, supersonic capability, and carried nuclear weapons over the U.S. and other countries. Worst of all, its Vmc was higher than its takeoff speed! This caused a few fatal crashes, one at the Paris Air Show in 1960! Incredibly, it only had one pilot! It was screaming for a flight engineer!
In January 1967 the Air Force flight engineers AFSC was changed from A43174 to A43570C. In 1975 it was changed to A11370C and thus was finally recognized as belonging in a flying career field instead of in aircraft maintenance. At some point since then the AFSC has been changed to 1A1X1C.
The civilian flight engineer field has grown steadily since the early days of the “Clipper” flying boats. In 1956, with the arrival of commercial jet aircraft, the Airline Pilots Association, ALPA, which represents the pilots of most scheduled air carriers, demanded that each jet carry three pilots on their crew.
A few airlines attempted to fly with four man crews, three pilots and one engineer, but this was found to be too costly. The airlines tried to get ALPA to back down but were unsuccessful. Then ALPA tried to get the Civil Aeronautics Board to accept the extra pilot in lieu of the flight engineer but the CAB insisted that the third crewmember must be a licensed flight engineer.
Their contract up for renewal at Eastern Airlines, flight engineers represented by the Flight Engineers International Association, FEIA, went out on strike. Acting in collusion with ALPA, Eastern started training pilots to be flight engineers, with much lower pay. The rate of hiring, training and placing new people in the cockpits proceeded at a furious pace.
One Friday a telegram was sent to all striking flight engineers demanding that they be present for duty at 0800 on Monday morning or they would be fired. Some flight engineers reported and some did not. Those who did not report were summarily terminated. Eastern then agreed to retain only those flight engineers who had reported for duty, however, they agreed to train them to subsequently become pilots. The new pilot-type flight engineers were referred to as Second Officers. Their pay was somewhat less than the First Officer’s pay, whereas the old flight engineer’s pay was somewhere between that of the First Officer and the Captain.
Following Eastern’s example, as the flight engineer’s contracts came up for renewal, the remaining airlines switched over to pilots trained as flight engineers. Since then most scheduled U.S. airlines have flight engineers who are primarily pilots who have obtained a flight engineers license to satisfy the FAA. The normal progression, then, is from second officer (flight engineer), to first officer (co-pilot), to captain (pilot). Because of its initiation of a fight by one union against another, ALPA was nearly expelled from the American Federation of Labor, AFL,
Interestingly, although ALPA had now won the war with FEIA over the qualifications of the third crewmember, pilot in lieu of mechanic, they had now inadvertently opened the question as to whether a third crewmember was even necessary. Airlines figured that if the third crewmember’s duties were not all that technical they could get by with only two pilots instead of three. The truth is that second officers were only performing their duties at the new hire level and were only counting the days until they could move to the right seat. They had little interest in their flight engineer duties.
In the mid-sixties, two similar airplanes from competing manufacturers were being certified at the same time, the Boeing 737 with a three-man cockpit and the Douglas DC-9 with a two-man cockpit. The 737 had a gross weight exceeding the 80,000-pound limit while the DC-9 prototype was slightly less than 80,000 pounds. Since the DC-9 would only need a two-man crew it would have a tremendous marketing advantage over the 737. The first 737’s went to Lufthansa Airlines and had a flight engineer’s panel. Mysteriously, on the eve of the completion of the DC-9 prototype the FAA changed its rule on the 80,000 pounds, to just whatever the FAA decided was too complex. Overnight the DC-9’s maximum gross weight soared as did it’s sales. The 737’s certification was subsequently changed to allow two-pilot operation, and thus changed the outlook for flight engineers.
Now, 2006, most major scheduled airlines have new-generation aircraft having only two-man cockpits, the flight engineer having supposedly been replaced by a computer. This appears to be a cost saving measure for the airlines, and for some maybe it has cut costs. It has certainly been widely used as a marketing factor by the manufacturers to the airlines. New-generation aircraft usually have only two engines but carry loads far exceeding first generation four-engine jets and having lower fuel costs due to engine improvements such as higher by-pass ratios. But, as these new-generation jets age, maintenance of these complex electronic computer controlled aircraft becomes a nagging nightmare.
Worse yet, safety in the new-generation jets is not as good as it could be and in some cases has been deplorable. The first fly-by-wire Airbus aircraft had a tendency to make perfect landings a hundred yards shy of the runway and to unaccountably shut down the engines in flight.
On September 3, 1998, a Swissair MD-11 had an electrical fire that the pilots were too busy to investigate or to extinguish. All on board died in the crash. They selected the wrong checklist amid other errors. While it is impossible to say that if a flight engineer had been on board they wouldn’t have crashed, however, most observers believe that a flight engineer would have made the critical difference. Neither of the pilots on board got out of their seat to fight the fire, or even look for it. They were simply overwhelmed.
The MD-11 is a development from the DC-10, which has a flight engineer. The MD-11 seems to be a perfect example of what happens when you get rid of the flight engineer. The MD-11’s safety record is so deplorable that the aircraft became a sales disaster and the production line was shut down.
Most non-scheduled U.S. airlines and other operators of large aircraft have followed a policy somewhat similar to the Air Force's regarding flight engineers. Their philosophy is that since they don't have regular routes and don't have maintenance facilities at many of their stopping points they want a Professional Flight Engineer, a PFE, who is also a licensed airframe and powerplant mechanic who can approve the aircraft for return to service following maintenance.
According to Federal Aviation Regulation, FAR, 43.3, an aircraft which has had maintenance performed must be approved for return to service, this can only be done by a U.S. certificated airframe and powerplant mechanic. The actual work, bending wrenches, may be performed by anyone as long as he is supervised by a U.S. licensed mechanic. This is where the PFE is necessary, he doesn’t actually do the work but he does supervise it and then signs the logbook returning the aircraft to service.
Typically the flight engineer will hire a local aircraft mechanic to perform the actual maintenance, regardless of whether this is in the U.S. or abroad. The local mechanic, though possibly licensed, in most cases cannot legally return the aircraft to service, because according to FAR 65.8 he must be familiar with that type of aircraft, so again, the flight engineer must supervise and sign the logbook returning the aircraft to service.
This is an important point that is frequently misunderstood, as many people have the erroneous notion that the PFE performs the actual maintenance work. It would be impractical for him to literally perform the work as he would be wearing his expensive uniform and would not have the necessary tools with him. The purpose of having a PFE instead of a second officer, is so that he can legally return the aircraft to service following maintenance performed by a local mechanic.
Some airlines (this verified by ATA and Kalitta Air) that operate on a non-scheduled basis but use pilot-type second officers instead of PFE’s, or they have new-generation aircraft which have only two-man cockpits, carry along a “Ride-On-Mechanic,” for the sole purpose of returning the aircraft to service following maintenance, should it become necessary. Thus, the cost saving measure of eliminating the flight engineer or using lesser-qualified second officers is a chimera because a mechanic must be carried along - and he occupies a fare paying passenger’s seat as well!
For comparison purposes, in 2006, first year guaranteed pay figures for qualified crewmembers at Kalitta Air, which has a mix of both, PFE’s and second officers, are:
Captain…………………………$65,148
First Officer……………………$43,920
Professional Flight Engineer…..$49,044
Second Officer…………………$35,868
Ride-On-Mechanic…………….$60,000
If a pilot is asked, “What’s a pilot?” He just answers, “I fly the airplane.” Everyone seems to know what this means and asks no more questions. Maybe someone will ask, “Who was flying the airplane when we took off? The co-pilot?” In these cases, the expression “fly the airplane” means to control the airplane about its three axes. However, as we’ve seen, flying the airplane is much more than simply controlling it about its three axes. On the Lockheed Electra, among other aircraft, neither pilot touches the throttles from taking the runway for the takeoff roll until turning final for landing.
One sticky question that has persistently been asked flight engineers is, “You’re a flight engineer? What’s a flight engineer?” If one simply says, “I’m responsible for the mechanical condition of the aircraft and operate the aircraft systems in flight,” it is guaranteed to elicit many follow-on questions. Probably the best answer is, “I’m one of the pilots.” This is a true statement too, since many flight engineers today are represented by the Airline Pilots Association, are scheduled by the pilot schedulers, report to the Chief pilot, are covered by the pilot’s contract, and so on.
It has been said that the flight engineer career field has been the most turbulent in the entire Air Force and civil aviation, and history seems to bear this out. Since the inception of the flight engineer program, the usefulness of the flight engineer has been amply proven. This specially trained technician has demonstrated that by his help during emergencies, precise engine management, and knowledge of the aerodynamic factors that affect aircraft performance - the safety, range, load carrying ability of the aircraft, and overall mission reliability could be increased. Today at his station on the flight deck of some of our larger aircraft, the flight engineer remains an important and respected member of the team that “gets 'em there and brings 'em back.”
References:
The American Flight Engineer, unpublished, 1975, by same author
Air Force Manual 51-9, dated 30 November 1961
Air Force Manual 51-9, dated 15 March 1968
http://www.airlinepilotcentral.com/
http://usmilitary.about.com/od/airforceenlistedjobs/a/afjob1a1x1.htm
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flight_Engineer
http://www.boeing.com/history/boeing/stratoliner.html
http://www.aviation-history.com/martin/m130.html
http://www.b737.org.uk/history.htm
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